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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the best-selling CD in the United States has been a
blank, recordable one. 1 Since 2000, revenue generated from CD sales has declined by over fifty percent. While the music industry is thriving, record labels
I DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR THE DIGITAL
Music REVOLUTION x (Susan Gedutis Lindsay ed., 2005).
2
David Goldman, Music's Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half CNNMONEY.COM, Feb.
3, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster-musicindustry/.
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are struggling to keep afloat.3 In 2010, digital music revenues grew by an estimated six percent globally to $4.6 billion, accounting for twenty-nine percent of
record companies' trade revenues.4 While there has been spectacular growth in
digital revenues, up more than one thousand percent in seven years, the value of
the entire recorded music industry has declined by thirty-one percent. For
record labels that have long relied on record sales as a primary source of revenue, these trends have been devastating.

Global Music Industry Turnover (1973-2009)
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3
See, e.g., Peter Kafka, Music Sales Still Going, Going ... , ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Feb. 8,
2011, 4:42 AM), http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20110208/music-sales-still-going-going/
("More than a decade after the Napster era, the music business is still declining: Warner Music
Group's sales dropped 14 percent in the last three months of 2010. And digital revenue, via Apple's iTunes and the mobile business, is sputtering too. It was up just 1.6 percent, and down 5
percent from the previous quarter.").
4
Mark Hefflinger, Report: Global Digital Music Revenues Up 6% to $4.6 Billion, DIGITAL
MEDIA WIRE (Jan. 20, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2011/01/20/reportglobal-digital-music-revenues-up-6-to-4-6-billion.
s
IFPI Digital Music Report 2011: Music at the touch of a button, IFPI, 5 (2011),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2011 .pdf.
6
Jay Yarow, CHART OF THE DAY: The Death of the Music Industry, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Feb. 16, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-music-industry-sales2011-2 (describing the chart as a "stunning visualization of the collapse of the music industry"
and noting that "the growth of digital sales is not doing enough to offset the death of the CD").
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Record labels have resisted rather than embraced technological advancements, and, as a result, the role of record labels in the production, manufacturing, and distribution of albums has been minimized.7 Record labels and
manufacturers no longer maintain control over the distribution of music. 8 It has
been taken out of the hands of record labels and placed into the hands of consumers.9 The ability to record and distribute music through the use of computers
has fundamentally changed the business model and the relationships between
artists and record labels.
Record labels are experiencing a "tectonic shift in the business model."' 0 Technological advancements have provided artists with an alternative to
signing with the "major labels." Record labels are, therefore, making less profit
from fewer bands, singers, and musicians than before." These alternatives,
coupled with recent interpretations of pre-internet record contracts,' 2 signal the
end of a music industry dominated by major record labels. While the recording
industry as we know it is coming to an end, the future of the music industry is
brighter than ever.' 3
This Note examines the impact of digital technology on pre-digital recording agreements. Part II discusses the history of the music industry with an
emphasis on the changes of intermediaries over time. Part II.B. and C. examine
the impact of technology on the traditional business model as well the historical
trends that occur as a result of the introduction of new technology. Part III discusses basic principles of contract interpretation. The recent Ninth Circuit case,
F.B.T Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records, is discussed in Part IV. This

case highlights the difficulties that arise when recording contracts do not contain
language regarding new technology and the difficulties in determining which
contract provisions control in those situations. Part V discusses the impact of the
Aftermath decision with regards to other recording contracts entered into prior to
the digital revolution. This Note concludes by noting the inadequacies of the

See Sara Karubian, 360' Deals: An Industry Reaction to the DevaluationofRecorded Music,
18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 398 (2006) ("The initial response of record labels to their deteriorating position . . . was to focus on maintaining the status quo in the traditional regime."); see
also Gary Myers & George Howard, The Future of Music: Reconfiguring Public Performance
Rights, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 207, 218 (2010) (noting that the record labels "continue to cling to
their old practices").
8
See generally Zeb G. Schorr, The Future of Online Music: Balancing the Interests ofLabels,
Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67, 68 (2003).
9
See Abhijit Sen, Music in the DigitalAge: Musicians and Fans Around the World "Come
Together" on the Net, GLOBAL MEDIA J. 1 (2010).
10
Id. at 10.
"
Michael Coren, Simple Downloads: Complex Change, CNN, Aug. 23, 2004,
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-08-18/techlonline.overview_1music-industry-music-fans-cdsales?_s=PM:TECH.
12
See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
13
See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 1, at 6.
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traditional business model as a result of digital technology and suggests that the
role of major record labels will be diminished as a result of market alternatives.
II. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
A.

The Emergence of the Music Industry as We Conceive of It Today

The early "music business was essentially [a] publishing business" whereby music publishers created and distributed sheet music.14 The widespread
dissemination of music by radio broadcast changed the music industry and the
role of music publishers." No longer was sheet music the product being sold.
Instead, the focus shifted to finding individual performers "who could 'sell' the
song."' 6 The advent of piano rolls in 1911 signaled yet another change in the
music industry. The music publishers no longer had exclusive control over the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of music.' 7 Faced with being pushed out of
the industry, music publishers turned to the courts.' 8 These developments in the
early part of the twentieth century led to the emergence of the music industry as
we conceive of it today.19
B.

The Nature ofRecording Agreements

For many artists, securing a recording contract with a major record label
is thought to be the first step to stardom. 20 For this reason, artists are often eager
to sign a recording contract, by which the artist transfers copyright ownership of
his or her recordings to a record label.21 In exchange, the record label provides
the artist with an advance payment in addition to a recording fund used to produce, manufacture, distribute, and market the album.22
The recording agreement is the essential instrument of the recording in23
dustry. This instrument shapes the relationships between artists and record
labels. The reality of the situation is that there are many more artists seeking

14

Myers & Howard, supra note 7, at 210-11.

1s

Id. at 211.

16

Id. at 212.
Id. at 214.

17

18
See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (addressing the issue
of whether a "mechanical reproduction" of a musical composition was an "unauthorized copy").
19
Myers & Howard, supra note 7, at 210.
20
See generally DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNow ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS

(7th ed. 2009).
21

See id

22

See id

23

See id
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recording contracts than there are record labels seeking artists to sign.24 The
unequal bargaining power between artists and record labels has enabled record
labels to offer contracts on essentially a "take it or leave it" basis. 2 5 These contracts often include harsh contract terms by which record companies maintained
near-complete control while receiving a "lion's share" of profits from record
sales.
In recent years it has become well-known that "[r]ecord companies are
not known for their benevolence to their signed recording artists."26 The fact is
that very few artists ever make it to superstardom and those who do rarely profit
from their albums.2 7 New artists are often "surprised to learn that they will not
'be living like a rockstar' and that "[o]nly top-selling albums make money for
recording artists."2 8 While many artists believe that they will receive enough in
royalties to sustain themselves for years, industry studies revealed that an estimated 99.6% of all recording artists are indebted to their record labels. 2 9 Artists
have long sued record labels out of discontent with their one-sided recording
agreements;30 digital technology has only made these inequities more apparent.
C.

New Technology and the TraditionalBusiness Model

Technological advancements have precipitated many "power struggles"
in the music industry in the past and continue to do so today.
Just about every new transformative technology was fought,
tooth and nail, until it no longer could be contained, discredited,
or sued out of existence, and only then it was reluctantly embraced, its providers acquired and controlled, then put to work
to bring in the bacon.

24

Starr Nelson, Rock and Roll Royalties, Copyrights and Contracts of Adhesion: Why Musi-

cians May Be Chasing Waterfalls, I J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 164 (2010).
25

Id. at 175.

26

SHERRI BURR & WILLIAM HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FILM,

TELEVISION AND Music 766 (2004).
27
See, e.g., David Nelson, Free the Music: Rethinking the Role of Copyright in an Age of
DigitalDistribution,78 S. CAL. L. REv. 559 (2005) (noting that musicians often have to sell over
a million copies of their albums before they ever see a royalty check).
28
BURR & HENSLEE, supra note 26, at 766.
29
See Schorr, supra note 8, at 83.
30
See, e.g., Ohio Players, Inc. v. Polygram Records, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 0033, 2000 WL
1616999 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2000); Pina v. Sony Discos, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6445(DAB), 1999 WL
349952 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1999); Cafferty v. Scotti Bros. Records, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Whether it was the radio in the 1920s, cassette recorders in the
1960s, or digital music in the 1990s, the industry reaction has
always been the same-but the outcomes have almost always
been the same, too.

[P]ower shifts from the old technology towards the new transformative technologies . . . .

For the past fifty years, the "major labels" (currently Sony/BMG,
Warner Music Group, EMI, 32 and Universal)33 have generated the majority of
their revenue from physical album sales. The business model has therefore been
focused primarily on selling records through physical distribution.34 Under the
traditional business model, "recorded music is placed onto a compact disc, tape,
or vinyl record; the physical components, such as jewel cases and paper inserts,
are manufactured; the record is distributed to retail and specialty stores; and
finally, the major label advertises, promotes, and markets the album."30
Most recording agreements entered into prior to the year 2000 reflected
the record labels' "presumption that a majority of their revenues would come
from physical 'sales,"' thus "requiring only marginal royalty payments to artists[.]"3 6 The Internet has changed the cultural landscape in a way that is inconsistent with the traditional business model.37 The shift to a digital distribution
system that "relies far more on licensing than sales-requiring higher royalty

3

KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 1, at 140-41.

EMI was seized by Citigroup on February 1, 2011, restructuring EMI by reducing its debt
sixty-five percent, to 1.2 billion pounds from 3.4 billion pounds. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Citigroup
Takes
Over
EMI,
DEALBOOK
(Feb.
1,
2011,
12:31
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/citigroup-takes-over-emi/.
3
Myers & Howard, supra note 7, at 217.
34
See generally Schorr, supra note 8, at 74.
32

35

Id

Brief Amicus Curiae of the Motown Alumni Association at 13, F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
3
See, e.g., Lynn Hirschberg, The Music Man, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/magazine/02rubin.t.html. Rick Rubin, American record
producer and co-president of Columbia Records, acknowledged the shortcomings of the "archaic"
business model:
Columbia is stuck in the dark ages. I have great confidence that we will have
the best record company in the industry, but the reality is, in today's world,
we might have the best dinosaur. Until a new model is agreed upon and rolling, we can be the best at the existing paradigm, but until the paradigm shifts,
it's going to be a declining business. This model is done.
Id.
36
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payments to artists under longstanding contracts," left record labels "unprepared" and "undercapitalized." 3 8
As seen throughout legal history, "[w]hen new music technologies and
media emerge, content distributors, including record labels, have often sought to
take advantage of these situations to use creators' works without additional
compensation."3 9 Every time a new technology hits the music industry, there are
predictable patterns that take place:
[1] The record companies scramble to see what their contracts
say about these devices. Since they didn't exist when the deal
was made, the contract either doesn't deal with them at all, or if
it does, it usually pays a royalty that proves to be wrong now
that the fantasy is a reality. [2] Because the technology is so
new, no one (including the record [labels]) really understands
its economics. Also, when it's first introduced, the thing is expensive, because it's a small market. [3] The result is a grace
period during which royalties on these newbies are not particularly favorable to the artist. This is to give the technology a
chance to get off the ground, and to help the record [label] justify the financial risk. [4] Invariably, this grace period goes on
far beyond its economic life, during which time the [labels]
make disproportionate profits and the artist gets a smaller portion of them than he or she gets on the dominant technology.
[5] As artist deals expire or are renegotiated, the rate goes up.
[6] Finally, an industry pattern develops and royalty rates stabil-

ize. 40
The response of record labels to digital downloading capabilities demonstrates that history has repeated itself once again. The story unfolded exactly as predicted. After strong resistance, Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, successfully
negotiated a contract with the major record labels. 4 1 Under the terms of the original iTunes agreement, iTunes was to receive thirty-five percent of revenue from
each download. 4 2 The remaining sixty-five percent would be paid to the record
labels.4 3 Although it was assumed by the record labels that the economics of the

38

40

41

Brief Amicus Curiae of the Motown Alumni Association, supra note 36.
Id. (citing N. Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)).
PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 162-63.
David Kusek, Will Artists Ultimately Profitfrom Digital Distribution?, FUTURE OF MUSIC

(Oct. 25, 2010, 11:13 AM), http://www.futureofinusicbook.com.
42
43

Id.
Id.
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transaction was identical to that of the traditional distributor/retail licensee,4
artists soon began questioning this arrangement.45
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY
Technological developments have presented difficulties in construing
meaning of terms embodied in recording agreements. Courts have encountered
new use problems in the past with the development of motion pictures, 46 television,47 and videocassettes. 48 In more recent years, new use issues have come to
the forefront once again. Courts have been tasked with determining whether the
provisions in older recording agreements include delivery by digital means that
were not yet developed at the time the contract was entered into.
When deciding questions of contract interpretation, the primary function
of courts is to ascertain the intention of the parties.49 In these disputes, courts
traditionally have looked to see if there is "any indicia of a mutual general intent
to apportion right to new uses."50 Such intent can be discerned from the language of the contract, the surrounding circumstances, industry custom, and subsequent conduct of the parties.51 If the recording agreement makes explicit reference to new uses, the plain language of the agreement controls.52 When the
agreement does contain language regarding the ultimate issue, it is wellestablished that a contract will be found to be ambiguous only if it is reasonably
and fairly susceptible of different constructions, not simply because two parties
urge opposing interpretations.

44

Id.
See infra Part IV.A.
46
See Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933) (noting that
"talkie" (motion picture) rights were unknown at the time of the contract and were therefore not
within the contemplation of the parties).
47
See Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that television was a foreseeable "new use").
48
See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that "the right 'to record [the composition] in any manner, medium or form' for
use 'in [a] motion picture[ ]' was broad enough to include the distribution of motion pictures in
video format). But see Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that license for
television viewing did not extend to videocassette release).
49
6 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLEPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 2585.10 (2011).
so
Rebecca J. Gremmel, Note, New Use and the Music Licensing Agreement, 22 T. JEFFERSON
L. REv. 239, 246 (2000).
45

51
52

Id.
FLETCHER, supra note 49.

53

Id.
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IV. F.B.T. PRODUCTIONS, LLC V. AFTERMA TH RECORDS

Under a standard recording agreement, artists "receive royalties from
both [record] sales and licenses of recorded music." 5 4 This distinction is important because the royalty rate received by artists for record sales is generally between ten to twenty percent of the Standard Retail List Price ("SRLP"), whereas
the royalty rate for licenses is typically fifty percent."
A.

Background

In 1995, F.B.T. Productions, LLC, signed American rapper, record producer, and actor, Eminem, to an exclusive recording deal.56 On March 9, 1998,
F.B.T. Productions entered into an agreement ("1998 Agreement") with Aftermath Records under which F.B.T. Productions transferred its exclusive rights in
Eminem's services to Aftermath Records in exchange for royalty payments.
The 1998 Agreement contained two different royalty provisions. 58 The first
royalty provision of the 1998 Agreement, the "Records Sold" provision, provided that F.B.T. Productions is to receive between twelve percent and twenty
percent of the adjusted retail price of all "full-price records sold in the United
States" through normal retail channels. 59 The second royalty provision of the
1998 Agreement, the "Masters Licensed" provision provided that .'[o]n masters
licensed by us . . . to others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any

other uses, your royalty shall be an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of our
net receipts from the sale of those records or from other uses of the masters."' 60
In 2000, the parties to the 1998 Agreement entered into a novation 61
("2000 Novation") that established a direct contractual agreement between Eminem and Aftermath Records. 62 Under the 2000 Novation, F.B.T. Productions
became a "'passive income participant."' 63 In 2003, Aftermath Records and
Eminem entered into a new recording contract ("2003 Agreement") terminating
54

Kerry A. Brennan & Cydney A. Tune, DigitalRights Implicate Issues in Music and Book

Publishing

Industries,

PILLSBURY

LAW

(Oct.

5,

2010),

http://www.Pillsburylaw.com/index.ctm?pageid=34&itemid=39879.
5s
Id.
56
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx), 2009 WL
137021, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), rev'd, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
57 Id.
5s
Id.
59
Id. (citing the 1998 Agreement).
60

Id.

6
A novation is defined as "[t]he act of substituting for an old obligation a new one that either
replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new
party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (9th ed. 2009).
62

63

Aftermath, 2009 WL 137021, at *1.
Id. (citing the 2000 Novation).
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the 1998 Agreement." This agreement included an increased advance and
higher royalty payments.6 5 The 2003 Agreement, like the 1998 Agreement, set
forth two different royalty provisions.
In 2004, the parties entered into the 2004 Agreement ("2004 Agreement").67 This agreement altered the 2003 Agreement "to increase the advance
for an upcoming LP, the fraction of [F.B.T. Production's] passive income participation, and certain royalty rates." 6 8 The 2004 Agreement also was amended to
provide that "Sales of Albums by way of permanent download shall be treated
as [U.S. Normal Retail Channel] Net Sales for the purposes of escalations ...
i,69

Since approximately 2001, Aftermath Records has entered into thirdparty agreements by which third-party entities are granted the rights to distribute
music to consumers over the Internet in various forms, including permanent
downloads. 70 A permanent download is a "digital cop[y] of [a] recording[] that,
once downloaded over the Internet, remain[s] on an end-user's computer or iPod
indefinitely." 7 1 In 2002, Aftermath Records, through its parent company, "concluded an agreement with Apple Computer, Inc., that enabled sound recordings,
including the Eminem masters, to be sold through Apple's iTunes store as permanent downloads."72
In approximately 2003, Aftermath Records began entering into thirdparty agreements with cellular telephone network carriers such as Nextel,
Sprint, T-Mobile, and Cingular to provide Eminem's recordings for use on mobile phones as "mastertones." 7 3 A "mastertone" refers to a short clip of a song
downloaded on a purchaser's cell phone that is used as a ringtone. 74 A "mastertone" also can refer to the music a caller hears, in place of a traditional ring,
when calling the cell phone of an individual who purchased a mastertone.
When used in this manner, the mastertone is stored on a central server and
"streamed" to the caller, in contrast to a permanent download.76

6
6
66
67
68
69
70

Id
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id
Id.
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.

72

Id
Id.

7

Aftermath, 2009 WL 137021, at *2.

74

Id

7

Id
Id.

71

76
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The Legal Dispute

In 2005, Eminem and F.B.T. Productions hired an accounting firm to
audit Aftermath Record's accounting records. 77 The audit revealed that Aftermath Records was paying the "Records Sold" royalty rate for music downloads
and mastertones instead of the "Masters Licensed" royalty rate.
In 2007, F.B.T. Productions brought suit against Aftermath Records for
breach of contract and asked for a declaratory judgment based on the royalty
rate used by Aftermath Records in calculating royalties owed to F.B.T. Productions. 7 9 F.B.T. Productions asserted that it was entitled to fifty percent royalties
under the "Masters Licensed" provision because the music downloads and mastertones were "masters licensed by [Aftermath Records] .

.

. to others for their

manufacture and sale of records or for any other uses . . . ."8 0 Aftermath Records
disagreed with the position taken by F.B.T. Productions and argued that royalty
payments for the music downloads and ringtones were to be calculated under
the "Records Sold" provision of the agreements.81
In F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records, the court was confronted with the issue of "whether the contracts' 'Records Sold' provision or
'Masters Licensed' provision sets the royalty rate for sales of Eminem's records
in the form of permanent downloads and mastertones." 82 Prior to trial, F.B.T.
Productions moved for summary judgment, asserting that "the Eminem Agreements unambiguously require[d] [Aftermath Records] to account for royalties
on permanent downloads and mastertones under the 'Masters Licensed' provision." 83 Aftermath Records cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the "'Records Sold' provision unambiguously applie[d] to permanent downloads and mastertones ....

84

In evaluating both parties' motions for summary judgment, the court
noted the following:
Under California law, when the meaning of the words in a contract is disputed, the Court must provisionally consider all extrinsic evidence that is relevant to show whether the contractual
language is reasonably susceptible to either of the competing in7
78
79

Id.

Id.
Id.

Id at *4.
Id. at *7.
82
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 2010). According to
the district court, "[t]he primary question presented [in] the case [was] what royalty [was] due
Plaintiffs when a consumer download[ed] an Eminem song to her computer or purchase[d] an
Eminemnringtone for her mobile phone." Aftermath, 2009 WL 137021, at *1.
83
Aftermath, 2009 WL 137021, at *3.
84
Id at *7
80

81
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terpretations advanced by the parties. This is the case even if the
contract appears unambiguous on its face, because "the fact that
the terms of an instrument appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different terms." "Extrinsic evidence can
include the surrounding circumstances under which the parties
negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and
subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the
parties." Whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law. If
the Court determines that the contractual provision in question
is ambiguous, summary judgment is inappropriate because the
differing views of the parties' intent will raise genuine issues of
material fact. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract is unambiguous.
Applying the correct legal standard, the court held that "[t]he Eminem
Agreements do not expressly state whether royalties on permanent downloads
and mastertones are to be calculated under the Records Sold provision or the
Masters Licensed Provision." 8 6 The court further pointed out that "neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have submitted evidence of the negotiating parties' discussions, drafts, or other contemporaneous expressions of intent as to how permanent downloads and mastertones were to be treated under the Agreements." 87
For this reason, the court found it necessary to "look to the nature of the contract
and the surrounding circumstances to interpret the contractual language." 88 Because the parties' conflicting evidence created a triable issue of fact, the district
court denied both motions and the case was submitted to the jury for determination. 8 9 The court instructed the jury as follows:
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 28
... All of the recording agreements and amendments, which are

part of the same transaction, must be interpreted together. If
there are any provisions in one of these documents limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting the provisions of another, all
these provisions should be given consideration in determining
the agreement of the parties.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 29
85

Id at *4.

86

Id.

87

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at *8.

88
89
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You should assume that the parties intended the words in their
recording agreements to have their usual and ordinary meaning
unless you decide that the parties intended the words to have a
special meaning.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 30
In interpreting the recording agreements, you should assume
that the parties intended words used in a technical sense to have
the meaning that is usually given to them by people who work
in the recording industry, unless you decide that the parties
clearly used the words in a different sense.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 31
In deciding what the words of the recording agreements meant
to the parties, you should consider the whole agreement, not just
isolated parts. You should use each part to help you interpret the
others, so that all the parts make sense when taken together.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 32
In deciding what the words in a recording agreement meant to
the parties, you may consider how the parties acted after the recording agreement was created but before any disagreement between the parties arose.
Interpretation of the parties' conduct is not limited to their joint
conduct, but may include any unilateral conduct of one party
without knowledge of the other party. However, the unilateral
conduct of one party is not conclusive evidence as to the meaning of the recording agreement.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 33
A contract must be interpreted to give effect to the agreement of
the parties at the time of contracting. You must determine what
the parties agreed to by the words used in the written recording
agreements. What the parties agreed to is based on the words
and acts of the parties and not on their thoughts or unstated intentions. 90

Jury Instructions, F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 1033332.
90
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After being read the above instructions, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Aftermath Records. The jury concluded that F.B.T. Productions was not
entitled to royalties under the "Masters Licensed" provisions of the agreements
and that Aftermath Records should pay royalties for permanent downloads and
mastertones under the contractual provisions that applied to the "Records Sold"
provision.9 1
On appeal, F.B.T. Productions reasserted that the "Masters Licensed"
provision unambiguously applied to permanent downloads and ringtones. 92 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "agree[d] that the contracts [were] unambiguous
and that the district court should have granted summary judgment to F.B.T."
For this reason, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court. 9 4
Aftermath Records requested a rehearing, which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied on October 21, 2010.95 On December 8, 2010, Aftermath Records
filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.9 6
The Ninth Circuit'sAnalysis

C.

The case primarily concerned questions of contract law. The court began its discussion by noting that "[u]nder California law, '[t]he language of a
contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and
does not involve an absurdity. '",9 The court was not persuaded by Aftermath's
argument "that the Records Sold provision applied because permanent downloads and mastertones [were] records, and because iTunes and other digital music providers are normal retail channels in the United States." 98 Its decision ultimately came down to the meaning of three terms: "notwithstanding," "masters," and "licensed."
1.

Interpretation and Application of the Term "Notwithstanding"

In response to Aftermath's assertion, the court pointed out that the
agreements provided that "'notwithstanding' the Records Sold provision, F.B.T.
Jury Verdict, F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 1470353.
92
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 2010).
91

93

Id.

94

Id

F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-55817, 0956069).
96
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), petitionfor cert.
filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2010) (No. 10-768). On March 21, 2011, the Supreme
Court of the United States denied the petition for writ of certiorari. F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).
9
Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d at 963 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638 (West 1872)).
98
Id. at 964.
9s
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was to receive a 50% royalty on 'masters licensed by [Aftermath] ... to others
for their manufacture and sale of records or for any other uses."' 99 Based on this
language, the court concluded that "[t]he parties' use of the word 'notwithstanding' plainly indicate[d] that even if a transaction arguably [fell] within the scope
of the Records Sold provision, F.B.T. [would be entitled] to receive a 50%
royalty if Aftermath license[d] an Eminem master to a third party for 'any'
use."' 00 For this reason, the court ultimately concluded that "the Masters Licensed provision explicitly applies to (1) masters (2) that are licensed to third
parties for the manufacture of records 'or for any other uses,' (3) 'notwithstanding' the Record Sold provision. This provision is admittedly broad, but it is not
unclear or ambiguous."' 0 '
2.

Interpretation and Application of the Term "Licensed"

To determine whether the "Masters Licensed" provision was applicable,
the court first needed to determine whether Aftermath licensed the Eminem
masters to third parties.102 Although Aftermath's argument that "there was no
evidence that it or F.B.T. Productions used the term 'licensed' in a technical
sense," was consistent with California law,o3 the court concluded that the third
party agreements were licenses even in the "ordinary"04 use of the term. o
The court found federal copyright law to be relevant in determining the
meaning of the term "license." The court recognized that "the differences between [the terms "sale" and "license"] play an important role in the overall
structures and policies that govern artistic rights."106 The court concluded that
Aftermath did not "sell" anything to Apple or other third party download distributors: "[t]he download distributors did not obtain title to the digital files. The
ownership of those files remained with Aftermath, Aftermath reserved the right
to regain possession of the files at any time, and Aftermath obtained recurring
benefits in the form of payments based on the volume of downloads." 07
99
Id.
1oo Id.
1o1

Id.

102

Id.

"The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather
than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or
unless a special meaning is given to them by usage . . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1644 (West 1872).
104
The term license in its ordinary use is simply "permission to act." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1302 (2002).
105
"Aftermath did not dispute that it entered into agreements that permitted iTunes, cellular
phone carriers, and other third parties to use its sound recordings to produce and sell permanent
downloads and mastertones. Those agreements therefore qualify as licenses under Aftermath's
own proposed construction of the term." Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d at 964.
106
Id. at 964-65.
107
Id. at 965.
103
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Both case law interpreting and applying the Copyright Act establish that
it is a settled principle that "where a copyright owner transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title, limits the uses to which the material may be put,
and is compensated periodically based on the transferee's exploitation of the
material, the transaction is a license." 0 8 Applying these principles, the court
concluded that "Aftermath's agreements permitting third parties to use its sound
recordings to produce and sell permanent downloads and mastertones [were]
licenses."l 09
3.

Interpretation and Application of the Term "Masters"

The terms of the Eminem Agreements defined a "master" as a "recording of sound ... which is used or useful in the recording, production, or manufacture of records."' 10 The court concluded that the sound recordings were masters after noting that Aftermath admitted that permanent downloads are records
and that the sound recordings supplied to third parties were "used or useful" in
the production of permanent downloads and mastertones. After noting that Aftermath admitted that permanent downloads are records and that the sound recordings supplied to third parties were "used or useful" in the production of
permanent downloads and mastertones, the court concluded that the sound recordings were masters.
In summary, the court held:
[T]he agreements unambiguously provide that "notwithstanding" the Records Sold provision, Aftermath owed F.B.T. a 50%
royalty under the Masters Licensed provision for licensing the
Eminem masters to third parties for any use. It was undisputed
that Aftermath permitted third parties to use the Eminem masters to produce and sell permanent downloads and mastertones.
. . . Because the agreements were unambiguous and were not
reasonably susceptible to Aftermath's interpretation, the district
11
court erred in denying F.B.T. summary judgment."
V.

THE MUSIC INDUSTRY AFTER F.B.T. PRODUCTIONS, LLC V. AFTERMATH
RECORDS

Although Peter Lofrumento, a Universal Music Group spokesman, argues that the Ninth Circuit's ruling "sets no legal precedent as it only concerns

108

Id.

109

Id. at 966.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id. at 967.

110

III
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the language of one specific recording agreement," 1 l 2 the implications of its
ruling are in fact far reaching. The Aftermath decision could provide copyright
holders and artists with a legal basis to challenge royalties received for music
downloads, ringtones/mastertones, and other digital formats.113 In fact, similar
litigation regarding royalty disputes demonstrates the consequential effects of
the Aftermath decision.
A.

SimilarLitigation RegardingRoyalty Disputes

As noted by the Motown Alumni Association ("MAA"), "[t]he 'Masters
Licensed' clause and the usage of standard terms [in the Aftermath case] parallel
the terms in a great many recording agreements."' 1 4 In fact, "the relatively standard nature of many recording agreements of a particular vintage""' is substantiated by the plethora of music industry treatises containing examples of "standard contract provisions."' 16 The fact that most recording agreements contain
similar if not identical provisions is evidenced by recent litigation concerning
the same issues as those in dispute in the Aftermath case.

Eminem is not the only artist challenging the record labels' characterization of digital downloads for royalty calculations. In 2006, the Allman Brothers Band and Cheap Trick commenced a class action for breach of contract and
declaratory judgment against Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Inc. ("BMG")
for "failure to properly account .

.

. for royalties with respect to recordings of

their musical performances or recordings produced by them which [were] sold
by 'Music Download Providers[]' . . . through digital distribution.""

These

"[t]wo highly successful rock groups from the 1970s and '80S118 alleged that

Joel Rosenblatt, Universal Music's Victory in Eminem Royalties Case Overturned on Appeal, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0903/universal-music-s-victory-in-eminem-royalties-case-overturned-on-appeal.html.
113
Marisa Sarig, Ninth Circuit Holds That Downloads, Ringtones Are Licensed Masters,
2
(last visited
ENTERTAINMENT LAW MATTERS, http://www.entertainmentlawmatters.com/?p=6
Oct. 3, 2011).
114
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Motown Alumni, supra note 36, at 11.
115
Declaration of Peter S. Menell in Opposition to Defendants' Motion In Limine No. 1 at 4,
F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17,
2009), 2009 WL 6315238.
116
See, e.g., MOSES AVALON, SECRETS OF NEGOTIATING A RECORD CONTRACT: THE MUSICIAN'S
112

AND AVOIDING SNEAKY LAWYER TRICKS (2001); RICHARD
GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS (1999).

"1 Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Allman v. Sony Music
BMG Entm't Inc., No. 1:06-cv-03252-GBD (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2006), 2006 WL 2307598.
118
Alan D. Barson, Artists Seek Greater Share from Label of Revenues from Digital Downloads, 22 No. 3 ENT. L. & FIN. 1 (2006).
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BMG was "paying them only a 'miniscule percentage' of royalties owed for
licensing their songs to [ ] digital music providers."'' 9
In their complaint, the Allman Brothers alleged that BMG's "inappropriate treatment of revenue received from Music Download Providers, in violation of [the] Recording Agreements, result[ed] [in their receipt of] approximately $45.05 per one thousand Music Downloads instead of the $315.50 to which
they [were] entitled (i.e., less than 15% of the compensation which they are
due)." 20 The following chart, which was included in the Allman Brothers complaint, is helpful in fully understanding the context of recent litigation concerning royalty disputes.

[Royalty Calculation Under "Records Sold" Provision]

1000 Units121

1000

Less Net Sales Deduction

22

(15%)

(150)

Total Units Credited to Plaintiffs

850

Total Wholesale Revenue Per Unit
Less Mechanical [Copyright] Royalty
ments to Publishers Per Unit

$0.70
23

Pay-

($0.069)

Net Wholesale Download Price Per Unit

($0.631)

Total Wholesale Download Price
(850 Units x $0.631 Per Unit)

$536.50

Less Container Charge

24

(20%)

($107.50)

Cheap Trick, Allman Brothers Sue Sony for Unpaid Royalties, 18 No. 5 ANDREWS ENT.
(2006).
120
Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 117, at 17.
121
"Unit" refers to the total number of units shipped, not sold. This is not the same number of
units that the artist will receive compensation for. This is because each recording agreement contains a "free goods" provision which is "[a] fixed percentage of units that are deducted from [the
total number of units] shipped to account for the number of units given away as promotional gifts
or sales incentives." See AVALON, supra note 116, at 296.
122 See supra text accompanying note 121.
123
Mechanical royalties are "[t]he 'royalty' paid to the publishing company for use of a composition in their catalog when it is reproduced on any record 'sold."' See AVALON, supra note 116,
at 297.
124
The container charge is "[a] percentage of the sticker price [usually] charged to the artist for
the packaging of the record." See id. at 295. In reality, the amount deducted for a container charge
is much more than the actual cost of packaging the album.
119

INDUS. LITIG. REP. 12
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Less [New Technologies] Deduction

25

(50%)

($268.75)

Royalty Base

26

Price

$160.25

Royalty Rate

27

(30%)

x .30

Net Royalty Payable

$45.05

[Royalty Calculation Under "Masters Licensed" Provision]
1000 Actual Units Downloaded

1000

Net Receipts remitted to Sony for 1000 Units sold
(@ $0.70 Per Unit)

$700.00

Less Mechanical Royalty Payments to
Publishers (approx. $0.069 Per Unit)

($69.00)

Total Net Licensing Receipts

$631.00

Royalty Rate
(@ 50% of Net Licensing Receipts)
Net Royalty Payable

X .50
$315.50
128

Categorizing an album sale as a "new technology" is a method used by the record labels to
pay an artist less for this type of configuration. "The concept behind the reduction comes from the
idea that research and development costs for [the] new products should be passed on to the artist .
. . ." See id. at 298.
126
The royalty base price is "[t]he amount of money that the royalty rate will be calculated
upon. Usually, the royalty base price is calculated by deducting taxes and container charges from
the sticker price of the record." Id. at 300.
127
The royalty rate varies for each artist and is set out in the recording agreement.
128
See Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 117, at 17.
Several treatises contain similar examples. For example,
[I]f a single-song download sold on iTunes for 99 cents, 29 cents of this
would go to iTunes, leaving 70 cents.... The record company then multiplies
this amount by your net royalty rate of, say, 10 percent, arriving at your royalty per single digital download of approximately [7] cents ($0.[70] x 0.10 =
$0.0[7]).
BOBBY BORG, THE MUSICIAN'S HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 189 (2008). This example does not "factor[ ] in other customary deductions like free
goods and reserves." Id.
125
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In 2007, The Youngbloods commenced a similar breach of contract suit
"on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated" for breach of contract and a
declaratory judgment against BMG for failure
to render to it and other artists accurate accounting statements
and to account for and credit properly royalties for digital music
download and mobile phone ringtone and ringback uses, during
the period between January 1, 1962, through December 31,
2002, generated by BMG's licensing of the plaintiffs and other
class members' master recordings to the third-party licensees. 12 9
The Youngbloods alleged that "of the 99 cents charged to consumers, by Apple,
for each music download, [they] receive[d] approximately 4.7 cents, when they
should [have] receive[d] in excess of 30 cents."130
The claims of The Youngbloods, the Allman Brothers Band, and Cheap
Trick are identical to those involved in the Aftermath case. Although final
judgment has not been reached in these cases, the Aftermath case has been cited
in recent court filings and likely will be a factor influencing their outcomes. 131
These cases have the potential to have an enormous financial impact on the major record labels and thousands of artists.132
B.

Inadequacies of the TraditionalBusiness Model as a Result ofNew
Technology

Major record labels using the traditional business model capitalized on
their dominance over both artists and smaller record labels. By financing the
production of music, record labels were able to facilitate the sale of records
through physical distribution. In order to maintain exclusive control, the major
record labels expanded the scope of their business by staffing individuals in
various departments including Artist and Repertoire ("A&R"),'" Sales, 13 4 Mar129
Youngbloods v. BMG Music, No. 07 Civ. 2394(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 43510, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011).
130
Id. at *2.
131
See id. at *6.
132
See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 33, Youngbloods v. BMG Music, No. 07 Civ. 2394
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 1643830.
The class of persons and entities for whose benefit this action is brought is so
numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While Plaintiff
does not presently know the exact number of Class members and such information can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are at least 2,000 Class members.

Id.
133
A&R executives "are responsible for finding and signing talent, as well as finding songs,
matching producers and artists, and generally overseeing projects." PASSMAN, supra note 20, at
120.
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139

keting,135 Promotion, Product Management,137 New Media,138 Production,
and Press. 14 0 Record labels capitalized on the expenses of recording albums.
Unlike their smaller counterparts, 14 1 major record labels own their own distributors,14 2 and therefore they do not have to compete with the small record labels
on a national level.
1.

Manufacturing Costs

By expanding the scope of their business to include editing, printing,
packaging, distribution, and promotion, record labels also have been able to
profit from the industry's dependence on physical distribution chains. 143 The
major record labels have controlled all aspects of distribution by owning and
operating record and CD manufacturing plants and storage warehouses. 14 4 These
costs are borne not by the record labels, but by the individual artists, providing
record labels with additional sources of revenue.
The decline in physical album sales has resulted in decreased revenue
for major record labels in the manufacturing and distribution aspects as well.
The reality now is that the record labels do not incur manufacturing costs to sell
digital music.14' They do not manufacture, package, or warehouse any physical

The sales department "[w]orks with the distribution companies and retailers to get records in
stores, on sale, and in the right positioning on the shelves." BORG, supra note 128, at 173.
135
The marketing department is responsible for "[a]dvertising, publicity, album-cover artwork,
promotional videos, in-store displays, [and] promotional merchandise." PASSMAN, supra note 20,
at 62.
136
The promotion department focuses on getting music out to the public. This is often accomplished by getting songs played on radio stations and garnering airplay. BORG, supra note 128, at
173.
137 "Product managers are in charge of whipping up all the other departments
(sales, marketing,
promotion, etc.) and getting them to work together to push [the] records." PASSMAN, supra note
20, at 62.
138
The new media department is responsible for developing websites for artists and marketing
them by setting up online promotions with various retailers. BORG, supra note 128, at 173.
139
The production department is responsible for "[m]anufacturing, cover printing, assembling,
and shipping physical product (CDs) to the distributors." PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 62.
140
The press department generates exposure for artists by coordinating album reviews, interviews, and appearances. BORG, supra note 128, at 173.
141
These smaller and often independent record labels distribute their recordings through the
wholesale distributors owned by the major record labels. Id. at 174.
142
"The major distributors include Sony/BMG (who distributes Columbia, RCA, and Epic),
EMD (who distributes EMI recordings and Capital), UMG (who distributes Interscope, A&M, and
Geffen), and Warner Music Group (who distributes Atlantic, Warner Bros., and Reprise)." Id.
143
See generallyPASSMAN, supra note 20.
134

144

Id.

145

Id.
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recordings.14 6 The record labels do not ship any product to stores or other distribution points. 147 They do not bear the risk of breakage or the return of unsold
recordings.14 8 These changes have reduced the revenue of major record labels
drastically, especially in the United States, "the largest digital music market in

the world."1 4 9
In 2010, revenues from digital channels accounted for almost half of
record companies' trade revenues in the United States.s 0 This has been "driven
by a combination of increasing digital revenues and the sharp decline in CD
sales caused in part by the closure of physical retail stores across the country."' 5 ' Sony, for example, operated three CD-producing facilities in the United
States.1 52 In 2003, that number dropped to two when it closed a CD plant in
Springfield, Oregon. 5 3 On March 31, 2011, this number dropped to one with
the closing of a plant in Pitman, New Jersey. The remaining plant is located in
Terre Haute, Indiana.154
2.

The Risks of Signing New Artists

Entry into the music industry has long been limited to those artists and
bands that have been able to grab the attention of A&R executives. For decades,
it has been the job of A&R executives to "scour the clubs for talent and listen to
hundreds of [CDs] from hopeful musicians in an effort to discover the next
chart-topping act."' 5 While A&R executives still play an important role in the
search for new talent, technology has expanded the channels for discovery. Recognition by A&R executives can launch an artist's career, but such recognition
is no longer the only avenue for entrance into the recording industry.
In the recording industry, "[i]t is nearly impossible to get discovered if
no one ever sees the band [or artist] play live." 5 6 A&R executives know the
importance of fans, which is one reason why "[b]ands [or artists] with large
followings have an easier time getting signed by a label." 157 The internet has
provided artists with the ability to independently develop a worldwide fan base,
146

Id.

Id.
Id.
149
IFPI, supra note 5, at 12.
150
Id.
151
Id
152
Greg Sandoval, What Happens when the CD Factory Closes?, CNET NEWS (Jan.
19, 2011,
4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001 3-20028837-261.html.
153
Id.
154
Id
147
148

1'

BURR & HENSLEE, supra note 26, at 692.

156

Id. at 646.

157

Id
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thereby increasing the likelihood of securing a recording contract with a record
label. Instead of "project[ing] the listening and music buying tastes of the public ,,158 A&R executives have the opportunity to project the success of an artist
based on his or her current following. The ability to project the success of an
artist prior to signing an artist to a record deal greatly reduces the risks involved.
C.

The Sales vs. License Distinction

Compensating artists under the "Masters Licensed" provision is more
consistent with current economic realities. The purpose of the "sale" versus
"license" distinction "is to provide for a higher royalty rate when the record
company licenses master recordings to third parties because in such situations
the record company does not incur the expensive incremental costs associated
with manufacturing, packaging and distributing the physical records associated
with the release."' 59 This distinction also reflects the "understanding that where
a record company is providing more services, [it] gets a bigger share" and when
the record company "provides fewer services, it gets a lesser share." 60
The contracts of many, if not most, recording artists who signed contracts beginning in the early 1960s and the early 2000s did not contemplate the
sale of recordings in the form of digital downloads. At that time, record labels
did contemplate that master recordings could be licensed to third parties who
would then distribute the recordings to others. At the beginning of the digital
music revolution in the early 2000s, many record labels, including Aftermath
Records, sought renegotiation of existing recording agreements.16' These renegotiated agreements contained new, additional clarification language with respect to digital downloads. In 2002, Aftermath Records "amended their standard
form agreements . . . to specify that digital downloads would be treated as
record sales, . . . rather than under the Masters Licensed provision."162 After-

math Records also "created a brand-new royalty rate for third party digital
downloads not found in any [previous] recording agreements."
Although the Aftermath decision likely will have no effect on recording
agreements signed in the last decade, it will have an enormous impact on record
labels' bottom lines. The major record labels collectively have sold thousands of
legacy artists' recordings through digital sales and most legacy artists have similar contractual provisions to those in the Eminem Agreements.
Id. at 693.
Deposition of Peter S. Menell at 223-24, F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV
07-03314 PSG (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2008).
160
Id. at 227.
161 Expert Report of David Berman at 7, F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, No. CV
07-03314 PSG (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3,2008).
162
Appellants' Reply Brief at *10, F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958
(9th Cir. 2010).
163
Id.
158
159
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VI. CONCLUSION

The music industry is larger than ever; however, the role of record labels in this industry is rapidly declining. As with any major industry transition,
"the most successful businesses do not waste time negating the new; rather, they
figure out how to embrace it before being outmoded by it."'6 The recording
industry at one time successfully anticipated and exploited trends, enabling the
record labels to thrive economically. At a time when the recording industry had
an opportunity to exploit digital technology, it chose to resist it, leaving room
for more innovative entrepreneurs. Apple with its iTunes digital store has continued to grow, selling more than ten billion downloads since 2003.16s
Technological advancements have provided artists with an alternative to
signing with a major record label, thereby changing the role of record labels in
the industry. Better consumer technology provides affordable options for recording. 166 Software programs such as Pro Tools allow artists to record music
from virtually anywhere with the use of a computer.167 YouTube, Facebook, and
other websites utilizing user-generated content ("UGC") have provided artists
with access to promotion channels, making it possible for artists to distribute
their music without the assistance of record companies.16 8
In 2010, record industry leaders are recognizing the importance of innovation. As stated by Mark Piibe of EMI Music, "'The record industry is more
open to new models now than it has ever been. We are experimenting in ways
that we wouldn't have considered three years ago, and we are also getting a lot
more sophisticated about the differences between markets."'6 9 However, it
appears as though this is too little, too late.
The factors that have allowed record labels to exercise dominance over
the industry are no longer present. The historical high barriers to entry into the
music industry have been lowered as a result of technological advancements.
Decreased transaction and production costs have allowed artists to become more
independent. As a result of artists gaining more control over their music, consumers have gained bargaining power. Record labels have thus lost their role as
"gatekeeper."

KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 1, at 8.
165 See IFPI, supra note 5, at 7.
166 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 1, at 143.
167 Id at 144.
168 Examples include internet and satellite radio; streaming services such as Pandora; social
'

networking sites such as MySpace, Twitter, and iLike; blogs; and other aggregators.
169 IFPI, supra note 5, at 7.
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Society is moving away from a world of ownership and is focusing instead on the world of access. 172 The Aftermath decision coupled with the changing demands of consumers and the inability of record labels to meet those demands ultimately has changed the role of record labels in the music industry.
The music industry no longer needs intermediaries to deliver music to consumers, who can access music directly at a much lower cost. An industry once controlled by so few is now controlled by the masses.
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